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CONSUMER PROTECTION IN CREDIT SALES-THE
1971 NORTH CAROLINA ACT
RICHARD M. SMITHt
Realistic and meaningful consumer protection in the goods and
services market is an objective that cannot be achieved through legisla-
tion based upon a single concept or approach. The market is beset by
at least two conceptually distinct, if factually interrelated, imperfec-
tions: the fraud-and deception that is continually practiced by certain
sellers and the superior knowledge and bargaining position of most
sellers that results in systematic overreaching by some. These imperfec-
tions are, of course, compounded by low levels of consumer awareness
and education.
The deception problem will be responsive to vigorous public en-
forcement of deceptive trade practices legislation.' The Federal Trade
Commission and state officials have important functions in this sphere,
and in recent years both have become more active on behalf of the
consumer. But public enforcement alone is not enough; new private
remedies should be created, and all private remedies should be enhanced
to a degree sufficient to make their exercise a real threat and sanction
to the violating seller.2
The bargaining imbalance can be corrected to some extent by ex-
panding the concepts in long-standing legislation. The Federal Trade
Commission Act and the North Carolina version thereof proscribe
"unfair" practices. The term "unfair" can be applied to minimize the
tProfessor of Law, University of North Carolina.
'E.g., Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-
1.1 (Supp. 1971).
2 These steps might include treble damages, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (Supp. 1971), or
minimum recoveries for violation, e.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act § 130(a)(l), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1640(a)(1) (1970) [hereinafter cited as CCPA] ($100-Federal Truth in Lending); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 646.638 (1971) ($200-deceptive trade practices). Provision should also be made for "rea-
sonable attorney's fees" for the prevailing consumer, e.g., CCPA § 130(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1640(a)(2) (1970). It is notable that federal district courts have exhibited no reticence in awarding
meaningful attorney's fees under that provision. The district court in one case awarded the plaintiff
$1,500. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv. Inc., 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 99,632
(S.D. Fla. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 449 F.2d 235, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 92 S.
Ct. 1248 (1972). The district court in Ratner v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), awarded the plaintiff $20,000.
3Federal Trade Comm'n Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1
(1970). The Supreme Court has recently affirmed the power of the Federal Trade Commission to
"proscribe practices as unfair or deceptive in their effect upon consumers regardless of their nature
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impact of overbearing, though not deceptive, sales tactics that contrib-
ute to the bargaining imbalance, or even to prohibit certain contract
terms. 4 However, more specific legislation is also required to provide
more detailed and predictable results and to invalidate certain contract
terms that are conclusively too unilaterally beneficial to the seller and
unjustifiably burdensome or harsh on the consumer. The effect of the
transaction, as well as the manner in which it is presented, should be
regulated, and this could best be accomplished by specific legislation.'
Specific legislation regulating consumer sale transactions has an-
cestry in the typical early retail installment sale act, which provided for
little more than a contract form and a limitation on finance charge
rates. It became apparent that such a limited approach was not an
adequate legislative response to the problem. Subsequent evolution and
amendment have resulted in a pattern of additional substantive pros-
cription. However, unlike the unfair and deceptive trade practices legis-
lation, this additional consumer protection legislation generally covers
only credit transactions. The ancestry of retail installment sale acts is
probably largely responsible for this restriction, but it is also probably
true that most of the objectionable consequences that are not reached
by the unfair and deceptive trade practices acts occur in the context of
a credit sale. Also, the restriction might be rationalized on the basis that
the cash buyer either does not stand to lose as much as the credit buyer
or quality as competitive practices. ... FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 92 S. Ct. 898 (1972).
The North Carolina statute is specifically directed at "fair dealing" at all levels of commerce. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (Supp. 1971).
'Acting under § 5(a), the Federal Trade Commission has proposed rules that would give
buyers in door-to-door sales a three-day "cooling-off" period, and numerous orders to this effect
have been issued in recent years. See note 59 infra. Also proposed are rules that would prohibit
the taking of negotiable instruments or waiver-of-defense clauses in consumer transactions. See
note 126 infra. Finally, the FTC has issued an order that prohibits the sale of more than $1,500
worth of dance lessons to a single customer. The limit was deemed necessary in order to "eradicate
the root of the evil," the evil being the use of relentless high-pressure tactics that were found to be
unfair. Arthur Murray Studio of Washington, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (1971 Trade Cas.) 91 19,529
(FTC 1971).
The rule-making authority of the FTC is, of course, unclear. A recent case has rendered invalid
an industry-wide rule that required the posting of octane ratings by gasoline stations. National
Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 340 F. Supp. 1343 (D.D.C. 1972). This does not, however, affect
the substantive reach of the "unfair" provision.
'Ultimate consumers are not the only group to seek specific legislation to correct bargaining
imbalance. See Automobile Dealer's .Franchise Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1970). The House
Report explains that the "legislation is required to remedy the manifest disparity in the ability of
franchised dealers of automotive vehicles to bargain with their manufacturers." H.R. REP. No.
2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1956). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-304 (1965).
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or is better able to fend for himself in the world of commerce.
In 1969 the North Carolina General Assembly enacted comprehen-
sive unfair and deceptive trade practices legislation to enhance con-
sumer protection.6 In 1971 the General Assembly enacted North Caro-
lina's first statute to offer substantial additional specific protection in
the area of consumer credit sales.7 That 1971 legislation is the principal
subject of this article. Following a brief discussion of the scope of the
legislation, its impact on the agreement stage and performance stage of
the transaction will be explored and compared with similar legislation
of other states.
THE SCOPE OF THE LEGISLATION
The substantive rules and prohibitions of consumer protection leg-
islation have no applicability to non-consumer business and commercial
transactions. Consequently, the consumer legislation must be carefully
delimited-a process that requires extensive elaboration. Six sections of
the North Carolina legislation (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the
"Act") are required to set out the basic rules governing scope.8 With
one exception,9 the Act applies only to "consumer credit sales," which
are sales (1) of goods or services, (2) by a seller who regularly extends
or arranges for an extension of credit, (3) to a buyer who is a natural
person, (4) in which the goods or services are purchased primarily for
personal, family, household, or agricultural purposes, (5) which involve
credit (that is, sales in which the purchase price is payable in stallments
or in which a finance charge is imposed), and (6) in which the amount
financed is not more than twenty-five thousand dollars. °
"Goods" is defined broadly to include items that are to be affixed
to real property." "Services" include not only personal services12 but
also privileges that are in the listed categories.'3 The combined goods
'Ch. 833, § I, [1969] N.C. Sess. L. 930-31, amending N.C. GEN. STAT. Ch. 75 (1965) (codifed
at N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 75 (Supp. 1971)).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 25A (Supp. 1971).
11d. §§ 25A-1 to -6 (Supp. 1971).
'1d. § 25A-37 (Supp. 1971) (refused sales).
"Id. § 25A-2(a) (Supp. 1971).
111d. § 25A-4(a) (Supp. 1971).
"Id. § 25A-5(a)(l) (Supp. 1971).
11"[T]ransportation, hotel and restaurant accomodations, education, entertainment, recrea-
tion, physical culture, hospital accomodations, funerals and other similar services." Id. § 25A-
5(a)(2) (Supp. 1971). Insurance and public utility services are excluded. Id. § 25A-5(b) (Supp.
1971).
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and services definitions insure that home improvement transactions are
included. Likewise, contracts for construction on real property that is
not to be conveyed as a part of the transaction would be included. 4 On
the other hand, a contract for the sale of real property is not included.
An inevitable question under statutes that do not cover all types of
property is how to deal with transactions that involve included property
as well as excluded property. That question is most likely to arise under
the Act with respect to a contract at a single price for the sale of a lot
and for construction of a house thereon. Viewed at the time of execu-
tion, the contract involves real property, services, and goods. The Act
does not contain an answer to such a question. Moreover, in analogous
contexts the courts have given different answers. One court has held that
the transaction should be divided and then subjected in part to the
statute and in part to other law. 5 However, under the Act that approach
would require a retrospective separation and valuation of elements that
are no longer functionally divisible and would result in an obligation,
probably evidenced by a single note, that would, for example, be partly
enforceable without regard to the buyer's defenses and partly subject to
those defenses;" partly subject to restrictions on collateral, 7 partly not.
Most courts have held that the predominent feature or "main object"
of the transaction is controlling. 8 This approach has the virtue of uni-
tary treatment of a single transaction, but in this context it could cause
distinctions between transactions that would be difficult to justify other-
wise than on grounds of expedience. 9
An alternative approach would be to assess whether the transaction
"This conclusion appears inevitable in view of the definition of goods, which includes goods
that are "used . . . in . . . construction on real property," id. § 25A-4 (Supp. 1971), and the
definition of services, which includes "work, labor," id. § 25A-5(a)(l) (Supp. 1971).
"Foster v. Colorado Radio Corp., 381 F.2d 222 (10th Cir. 1967). In Foster the contract
involved the sale at a single price of a radio station, including the goods used in the operation of
the station. The defendant repudiated the contract and the plaintiff sold the station to another
person. However, the plaintiff did not give notice of the resale to the defendant as required by § 2-
706(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code. The court held that the part of the contract involving
"goods" was governed by the UCC, while the remainder was governed by other law.
"See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-25 (Supp. 1971).
'
TSee id. § 25A-23 (Supp. 1971).
"Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM,. L. Rev. 653
(1957); Note, Dual Nature Contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code, 28 MD. L. REv. 136
(1968).
"For example, a contract entered into.when a building was 40% complete might be covered,
whereas if the building were 50% complete it might not be. Substantial rights must ultimately
depend upon some distinction, but this one seems unnecessarily mechanical.
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is one in which the buyer needs the protections afforded by the Act. If
it is, the court justifiably could apply the Act to the entire transaction
whenever there are substantial goods and services to be rendered, even
though at the time of the contract construction had progressed to the
point at which "real property" predominated.2"
At the other extreme, the courts might exclude any construction
contract that included the sale of substantial and related real property.
But the seller-builder of real estate who sells on the installment plan
cannot be assured of an exemption at this time. It must be noted,
however, that most housing purchases are financed on a direct loan
basis, and such transactions are clearly not within the Act."
The requirement that the seller be engaged in arranging or in ex-
tending credit in the regular course of business 22 is a recognition of that
feature of the Consumer Credit Protection Act.2 The requirement
serves to exclude incidental sales made by persons who are not in the
business of selling goods or services.
The "primarily for personal, family, or household" statement 24 is
the now universal test for "consumer" purpose, and it has given rise to
so few questions under the Uniform Commercial Code that it must be
largely self-explanatory. "Agricultural" is not defined in the Act. How-
ever, Regulation Z of the Federal Reserve Board contains an extensive
definition that is a useful point of reference.
"Finance charge" is defined as "the sum of all charges payable
directly or indirectly by the buyer and imposed by the seller as an
incident to the extension of credit. 216 Time-price differential, carrying
charge, and other euphemisms for interest are mentioned illustratively.
"Loan fee" and "finder's fee" are also mentioned, but the general re-
quirement that the charge be imposed by the seller would seem to ex-
clude a broker's fee that is imposed by and paid to an independent third
person. Permissible insurance charges, closing costs in real-property
transactions, and official fees paid to record or file security interests are
not a part of the finance charge.
"Payable in installments" means payable, pursuant to agreement,
2 See R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 22, at 47 (1970).
21N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-I (Supp. 1971).
221d. § 25A-2(a)(I) (Supp. 1971).
-CCPA § 103(0, 15 U.S.C. § 1602(0 (1970).
21N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-2(a) (Supp. 1971).
2'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-109.
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-8 (Supp. 1971).
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in more than four installments, excluding a down payment." The inclu-
sion in the Act of this type of credit, which has no visible finance charge,
is justified for at least two reasons. First, a seller whose performance
obligation is not deferred and who defers payment of the price is incur-
ring a credit expense. It is inconceivable that this expense is not being
passed on to the buyer in the form of an increased price. " Secondly,
there is potential for overreaching by sellers whether or not a credit
expense is involved. That potential increases in proportion to the size
of the transaction. When the price in a transaction reaches such a level
that in relation to the individual buyer's situation it must be spread over
the future, the transaction is certainly so significant to that buyer that
the protections of the Act should be available to him. One might ask
why the less-than-four-installment credit was excluded. The only possi-
ble answer is that in the judgment of the General Assembly, the short-
term, no-finance-charge credit did not pose sufficient potential for abuse
or injury as to justify regulation at this time. There is no magic in four
installments, but the test did have the virtue of conforming to Regula-
tion Z at the time the Act was adopted.
However, it is probable that the coverage of more-than-four-
installment credit has been sidetracked by an indirect source. The Act
"does not apply to any party or transaction that is not also subject to
the provisions of the Consumer Credit Protection Act . . .. "I At the
time the North Carolina Act was adopted, Regulation Z, promulgated
under the Consumer Credit Protection Act, provided for coverage of
more-than-four-installment credit." That regulation had been chal-
lenged but upheld by at least two federal district courts.3 Therefore,
2Id. § 25A-3 (Supp. 1971).
mThe seller is precluded from "burying" an excessive finance charge in a price increase that
is applicable only to credit purchasers. "Cash price" is the basic element of "amount financed."
from which the finance charge is computed. Id. § 25A-9(l) (Supp. 1971). "Cash price" is limited
to the price "at which goods and services are offered for sale by the seller to cash buyers,"
Id. § 25A-7 (Supp. 1971).
However, some sellers make few if any cash sales from which a normal cash price could be
determined. Such sellers can in effect bury the finance charge in a uniform high sale price. As a
group those sellers are probably the worst exploiters of the low-income consumer. See D. CAPLOV-
IVZ, THE POOR PAY MORE 16-20 (1967). It would be ironic to enact a consumer protection statute
that excluded those sellers. However, that is what may have inadvertently happened. See text
accompanying note 34 infra.
21N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-I (Supp. 1971).
-'12 C.F.R. § 226.1, .2(k) (1971) [hereinafter cited as Regulation Z].
31Stompolos v. Premium Reader's Serv., 326 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (N.D. III. 1971) (the rule
is "necessary to prevent truth in lending from becoming a hoax and delusion on the American
public"): Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 1 99,632
(S.D. Fla. 1970).
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the general statement in the Act, which was added to the bill late,
appeared at the time not to be inconsistent with the other provisions of
the Act.
However, in Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc.,2 the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the four-installment rule
in Regulation Z was invalid because it was beyond the rule-making
authority granted to the Federal Reserve Board by Congress and be-
cause it was an unconstitutional conclusive presumption that a finance
charge was present in more-than-four-installment credit since the fed-
eral statute covers only transactions in which a finance charge is im-
posed.:3
Neither of the grounds for invalidity of the federal regulation has
any application to the North Carolina Act. The General Assembly has
expressed clearly an intent to regulate such credit, and the regulation
does not proceed from a presumption that a finance charge is present;
rather, it proceeds directly from a proposition that such credit should
be regulated. Moreover, the North Carolina Act and the federal law do
not have the same objectives. The North Carolina Act is directed pri-
marily at regulating conduct in the market place through direct substan-
tive rules. As previously has been pointed out, the regulation of four-
installment credit is absolutely consistent with the purposes of the North
Carolina Act. But in the context of the federal statute, with its emphasis
on finance-charge disclosure, the four-installment rule is more question-
able, and it is quite possible that the Mourning case will stand and will
be followed elsewhere.
Thus, the general expression of limitation in section one of the
North Carolina Act will have to be recognized. It might be argued that
the Act refers to the federal law and regulations as they existed at the
time of the enactment of the North Carolina Act. But the General
Assembly was undoubtedly intending to incorporate valid federal law
and regulations, and since the regulation is unconstitutional, it would
in any event normally be considered void ab initio.3 4 The Act will not
cover more-than-four-installment, no-finance-charge credit unless
32449 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 1248 (1972).
"The statute refers only to transactions in which a finance charge is imposed and does not
mention four installments. CCPA §§ 103(f), 121(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(f), 1631(a) (1970).3 E.g., Stewart v. Davidson, 218 Ga. 760, 130 S.E.2d 822 (1963); Miller v. O'Malley, 342
Mo. 641, 117 S.W.2d 319 (1938); O'Brien v. Rutherford County, 199 Tenn. 642, 228 S.W.2d 708
(1956). That is not an invariable proposition, but certainly it would be applied in defense of a four-
installment seller who claimed the Act did not apply to his past activities.
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Mourning is reversed or the General Assembly amends section one of
the Act.
THE CREDIT CARD EXCLUSION
A most significant general exclusion from the Act is a "sale in
which the seller allows the buyer to purchase goods or services pursuant
to a credit card issued by someone other than a seller. . . ."-1 Thus,
sales effected through an independent credit card, such as the now com-
mon card issued by bank-related companies, are not affected by the Act.
This unequestionably constitutes a potentially large escape valve from
the Act. A seller who is dissatisfied because of restrictions imposed on
the traditional retail installment sale contract can try to shift substantial
numbers of his buyers to the bank credit card. The extent to which this
will occur is dependent upon a number of variables, such as the size of
the transaction, "'s the difference in net cost to the seller between the
discount on credit card receivables and installment sale receivables, 7
and the relative affluence of the seller's customers.
However, whether or not credit card buying patterns change in
apparent response to this exclusion, the exclusion should be re-examined
by the next General Assembly. The probable reason for the exclusion
was uncertainty over whether the provisions in the Act that preserve the
buyer's defenses35 should apply to the bank credit card. The bank credit
card transaction might be analogized to a direct loan or to a letter of
credit transaction, "9 in which it has not been supposed that the buyer
should be able to assert defenses in the underlying obligation against the
party advancing the funds. Also, a high percentage of credit card trans-
actions are cash or check substitutes from the point of view of the
5N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-2(c) (Supp. 1971). The exclusion is not available if the credit card
issuer is (I) the seller, (2) a subsidiary or parent of the seller, (3) a "principal supplier" of the seller,
or (4) related to the seller by common ownership (25% of the voting stock of the issuer and seller
owned by a single shareholder). Excluded credit card transactions would be subject to id. § 24-11
(Supp. 1971).
31The bank credit card issuers impose credit limits that typically range from $300 to $500. If
the limits are enforced, they would constitute a barrier to substantial movement of the cards.
"The discount rate for credit card transactions may not exceed 4%. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-
1 l(a) (Supp. 1971). There is no comparable limit for installment paper discounts, and they are
probably higher on the average than 4% per annum. However, it is impossible for a seller to
compare the two without knowing what terms the buyer would have requested had he purchased
under a retail installment sales contract.
mid. § 25A-25 (Supp. 1971).
a"Brandel & Leonard, Bank Charge Cards: New Cash or New Credit, 69 MIcH. L. REv. 1033,
1046-48 (1971).
[Vol. 50
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buyer,4" and a buyer in a cash transaction is remitted to recourse only
against the seller. However, given a limitation that would isolate and
exclude the cash-substitute transactions and other reasonable limita-
tions, the position of the bank in relation to the consumer in the remain-
ing transactions is strikingly similar to the position of the bank as an
assignee of the consumer's retail-installment-sale contract. In both situ-
ations the bank has superior expertise in selecting the merchants with
whom it will deal, superior leverage in cases of dispute, and risk-
spreading capability. In apparent recognition of these facts, at least one
state has enacted legislation that subjects the credit card issuer to the
defenses of the consumer in appropriate cases.4 '
CLASSIFICATION OF CREDIT
The Act divides "consumer credit sales" into two well-recognized
categories: (1) revolving or open-end credit (hereinafter referred to as a
"revolving charge account contract") and (2) other sale credit (herein-
after referred to as a "consumer credit installment sale"). This division
is made primarily for the purpose of establishing different rate limita-
tion structures for the two types of credit42 so that the rates will reflect
patterns that have developed in the industry. Most other substantive
provisions of the Act apply to both categories of credit, although a few
provisions are specifically or inherently applicable to only one of the
categories.
A "revolving charge account contract" is defined43 in essentially
the same language that defines "open-end credit" under the Consumer
Credit Protection Act." The key elements of such credit are an agree-
ment for credit extension from time to time, the computation of a
finance charge on the unpaid balance, and the debtor's privilege of
paying in full or in installments. These elements describe the typical
department store revolving charge account or seller-issued credit card
411d. at 1059-61.
"
1CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.90 (West Supp. 1972). Under this act the card issuer is subject to
all defenses if (1) the purchase price is over $50, (2) the sale takes place in California, (3) the card
holder makes reasonable demands for satisfaction against the retailer, and (4) the card holder gives
appropriate notice to the issuer. The $50 limit excludes most cash substitute transactions; the
geographical limit narrows the responsibility of the card issuer to those merchants that it has some
real chance to know about and police. Both appear to be reasonable limitations.
"
2N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25A-14, -15 (Supp. 1971).
111d. § 25A- I1 (Supp. 1971).
"Regulation Z § 226.2(R).
1972]
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account. A "consumer credit installment sale contract" is defined sim-
ply as any other type of credit.4 5
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE LEGISLATION
Discussion of the substantive provisions of the Act is divided along
functional lines. The transaction is viewed as moving from agreement
through performance, and the provisions of the Act are discussed at the
point in the development of the transaction at which each is most likely
to become relevant.
The Agreement Stage
General Limitations and Requirements. All consumer credit in-
stallment sale contracts "shall be in writing, dated and signed by the
buyer."" This general statute of frauds extends to many transactions
that were not formerly subject to a requirement of a writing. Formerly,
the statute of frauds applicable to contracts for the sale of goods applied
only to contracts in which the price was at least five hundred dollars;"
there was no statute of frauds for sales of services. However, security
agreements were required to be in writing unless the secured party had
possession of the collateral." The new provision neither makes any
exceptions nor specifies a direct consequence of violation. However, it
is probable that the courts will engraft exceptions to the extent that they
have always done so with the statute of frauds and that an oral contract
will be unenforceable unless it falls within such an exception.
Also, the Act contains several direct prohibitions on contract
terms. Any agreement or authorization to "any person" to confess
judgment for the buyer on a claim arising out of a consumer credit sale
is void. 9 This clearly precludes the use of the cognovit clause, whether
"
5N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-12 (Supp. 1971).
1Id. § 25A-28 (Supp. 1971). Of course, this does not apply to revolving-charge-account con-
tracts.
47d. § 25-2-201 (1965).
4.d. § 25-9-203 (1965).
"Id. § 25A-18 (Supp. 1971).
OIt is sometimes stated that the cognovit clause is unenforceable in North Carolina. E.g., P-
H CONSUMER & COMMERCIAL CREDIT GUIDE 1 1405, at 1404. That may be true. However, the
onlydirect statutory prohibition was contained in the Negotiable Instruments Law, ch. 733, [18991
N.C. Sess. L. 926-51, which was repealed on the effective date of the Uniform Commercial Code.
The present N.C.R. Civ. P. Rule 68.1 provides a procedure for confession of judgment by a
"prospective defendant." The procedure would be cumbersome for the seller if undertaken by the
[Vol. 50
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or not the buyer is given notice and a hearing prior to entry of the
judgment,5 but, of course, does not invalidate an entry of confession by
the buyer in a pending action.
Similarly, the agreement may not contain a disclaimer of express
warranty in any case in which the seller has made an express warranty. 52
This provision should preclude the use of a boilerplate express warranty
disclaimer clause in standard forms because there is always a possibility
that the seller will make statements constituting express warranties dur-
ing the course of individual negotiations. If this section is violated-that
is, if the seller creates express warranties during negotiation and pur-
ports to disclaim them in the final writing-the written disclaimer
should be disregarded with the result that the parol evidence rule53
would not apply to prevent introduction of the buyer's evidence of an
oral warranty.
The Act restricts the property of the buyer that may be subjected
to the security agreement.-4 Basically, the seller may take a security
interest only in the property that is being sold and in any property
consumer himself. But the rule does not speak to the question of who might "represent" the
consumer defendant-that is, the question whether a cognovit clause that gives the seller authority
to select an "attorney" for the consumer would be valid. Therefore, it seems not inappropriate for
this Act to make special provision against confession of judgment.
5'The cognovit clause that may operate to produce a judgment without notice and opportunity
for hearing has been attacked on the ground that it constitutes a denial of due process of law under
the fourteenth amendment and that there is no knowing waiver of the consttitutional right by the
consumer. The court in Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1969), affd on other
grounds, 92 S. Ct. 767 (1972), held that there was not a knowing and effective waiver by persons
who earn less than $10,000 per year. In Osmond v. Spruce, 327 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Del. 1971),
vacated and remanded mem., 92 S. Ct. 1189 (1972), the court held that the plaintiffs were entitled
to a hearing on the issue of voluntariness of the waiver prior to entry of the cognovit judgment.
The Supreme Court recently refused a blanket condemnation of cognovit clauses in D.H. Overmyer
Co. v. Frick Co., 92 S. Ct. 775 (1972). However, the consumer transaction received mention in
the opinion: "[W]here the contract is one of adhesion, where there is great disparity in bargaining
power, and whether the debtor receives nothing for the cognovit provision, other legal consequences
may ensue." Id. at 783.
51N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-20 (Supp. 1971).
-1d. § 25-2-202 (1965). Terms of a contract that violate an express statutory prohibition are
surely not within the contemplation and protection of that section.
541d. § 25A-23 (Supp. 1971). This section applies to "consumer credit sales," a term that
covers both revolving credit and other credit. Therefore, by implication it authorizes the revolving-
credit seller to take a security interest within the limits of the section. Id. § 24-11 (Supp. 1971)
prohibits the taking of security in a revolving-credit transaction. However, in the view of the
author, § 24-1 l(a) has been amended as to revolving credit that is within the scope of the Act,
but, of course, § 24-11 (a) will continue to prohibit security in revolving-credit transactions that
are not covered by this Act, such as bank credit cards.
19721
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
previously sold in which the seller still has a security interest.5 Also, if
the seller sells goods that are affixed to other personal property, he may
take a security interest in the other property if the amount financed is
more than three hundred dollars; if he sells goods that are affixed to real
property, he may take a security interest in the real property if the
amount financed is more than one thousand dollars; and if he repairs a
motor vehicle, he may take a security interest in the vehicle if the
amount financed is more than one hundred dollars.
In regard to terms for repayment, the parties may not contract for
any installment payment that is more than ten percent larger than the
average of earlier scheduled payments, except where the "payment
schedule is adjusted to the seasonal or irregular income of the buyer.""
Also, there are generous limitations upon the time during which pay-
ment may be scheduled.57
Finance charge limits and other fee restrictions will be discussed in
a later section.
Cancellation Rights-Home Solicitation Sales. A consumer can
be subjected to high-pressure sales tactics and induced under a variety
of circumstances to purchase something that he does not need at a price
that he cannot afford. But experience has shown that this happens with
exceptional frequency when the sales pitch is delivered at the consumer's
home. Several factors probably contribute to this heightened suscepti-
bility.58
The consumer in the home who is subjected to high-pressure tactics
has relatively unpleasant alternatives: He can force the salesman out of
his home or he can leave the home himself. On the other hand, a
customer in a public retail establishment has the easy alternative of
walking away. Many home solicitation sellers have only one product to
sell and only one relationship with a single customer. Few restraints are
imposed by desire to build and maintain customer loyalty. Moreover,
there are fewer diversions in the home, and a skillful salesman has a
psycologically better setting in which to focus the customer's attention
than in the typical, often crowded retail establishment. Finally, the
OWhether and to what extent a seller retains a security interest in previously sold items in
multiple-sale contexts is determined by the application of payment rules. Id. § 25A-27 (Supp.
1971); see text accompanying notes 104-05 infra.
56Id. § 25A-34 (Supp. 1971). The final payment may be 25% larger than the previous averages.
571d. § 25A-33 (Supp. 1971).
"Most of these factors are covered in Project-The Direct Selling Industry: An Empirical
Study, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 883 (1969).
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salesmen typically earn only commissions, with the result that there is
greater pressure to produce sales than is present with respect to retail
store employees generally.
In recent years many jurisdictions have recognized the peculiar
attributes of the home solicitation sale and have enacted or enforced
regulatory legislation and orders .5 The basic pattern of regulation pro-
ceeds from the assumption that once the salesman has gone from the
house the pressures are removed and the consumer can make an objec-
tive judgment concerning the deal into which he has just entered. There-
fore, adequate protection is afforded the consumer if he has the right
to reflect upon the contract before becoming irrevocably committed to
it. The consumer is given a "cooling-off period" during which he can
rescind or cancel the obligation 0
The North Carolina statute is similar to the Uniform Consumer
"Act 2052, § 8, [1971] Ala. Laws (I CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE (Ala.) 91 6013 (Oct. 26,
1971)); ALASKA STAT. § 45.05.125 (1971); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-5001 to -5008 (Supp.
1971); CAL. CIv. CODE .§ 1689.5-.13 (West Supp. 1972); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-2-501 to
-505 (1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE (Colo.) 9l 4690 (June 6, 1972)) (Uniform Consumer Credit
Code); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-134 to -139 (Supp. 1971); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3811 (2
CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE (D.C.) 6161-64 (Dec. 21, 1971)); FLA. STAT. ANN. .§ 501.021-
.045 (Supp. 1971); GA. CODE ANN. § 96-906 (Supp. 1970); IDAHO CODE §§ 28-32-501 to -505
(Supp. 1971) (Uniform Consumer Credit Code); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 19-22-501 to -505 (Supp.
1971) (Uniform Consumer Credit Code); H.B. 176, [1972] Ky. Acts (2 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT
GUIDE (Ky.) 111 6251-55 (Mar. 14, 1972)); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 4661-69 (Supp. 1972);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, §§ 28-35 (Supp. 1971); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.416(201)-(207) (Supp.
1972); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 361-b: 1-3 (Supp. 1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:16C-61.5 to -
61.8 (1970); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 425-30 (McKinney Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25A-
38 to -43 (Supp. 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, §§ 2-501 to -505 (Supp. 1971) (Uniform
Consumer Credit Code); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 83.710-.750 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-7
(1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 6-28-I to -8 (1969), as amended, id. §§ 6-28-3 to -4 (Supp. 1971);
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 37-24-3 to -5 (Supp. 1971); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 70B-2-501 to -
505 (3 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE (Utah) 91 4690 (Sept. 18, 1969)) (Uniform Consumer Credit
Code); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2454 (1971); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-21.1 to -21.6 (Supp. 1971);
WVo. STAT. ANN. 40-2-501 to -505 (Supp. 1971) (Uniform Consumer Credit Code). The Fed-
eral Trade Commission has proposed a trade regulation rule that would require all door-to-door
sellers that are within FTC jurisdiction to grant a three-day cancellation right. Proposed FTC Reg.
§ 429, 35 Fed. Reg. 1212 (1970). Also, the FTC has recently issued or obtained in individual cases
many orders that require a three-day cancellation right. E.g., Natpac Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
(1971 Trade Cas.) 19,695 (FTC 1971); Capitol Sewing Machine Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (1970
Trade Cas.) 9U 19,439 (FTC 1970).
Related, though dependent upon the presence of a lien on the buyer's principle residence rather
than home solicitation, is the cancellation provision of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. CCPA
§ 125, 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1971).
"Three business days has become the virtual standard. However, the FTC has ordered a seven-
day cooling-off period in relation to dance lessons. Arthur Murray Studio of Washington, Inc., 3
TRADE REG. REP. (1971 Trade Cas.) 1 19,529 (FTC 1971).
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Credit Code provisions,"' but the North Carolina version contains a few
amendments that were apparently designed to make it more inconven-
ient for the consumer to exercise his right effectively, as well as a few
that operate to the advantage of the buyer.
The statute applies only to "home solicitation sales" that are also
"consumer credit sales. 16 2 It does not cover any cash transactions, and,
because of the implications of Mourning v. Family Publications Service,
Inc.,63 it probably will not cover credit sales in which no stated finance
charge is imposed, such as certain long-term magazine subscription
contracts 4 or certain transactions in which the goods are substantially
overpriced initially.
A "home solicitation sale" is a sale in which "the seller . . . en-
gages in a personal solicitation of the sale at a residence of the buyer
and the buyer's agreement . . . is there given . "I' A sale solicited
or consumated outside the buyer's home-for example, at a neighbor's
residence-is not affected. However, the statute does not require that
"all" solicitation must occur at the buyer's home, and a seller who
enters the buyer's home without a firm agreement to purchase already
obtained would be best advised to comply with the statute.,
There are two'types of specific exclusions: (I) those transactions in
which pre-existing relations between the parties presumably indicate the
existence of an atmosphere of trust that dispenses with the need for
statutory protection, and (2) those transactions that are apparently the
result of special interest influence. In the first category are sales to a
buyer who has had similar previous dealings with the seller, sales made
pursuant to a pre-existing charge account, and sales "made pursuant to
negotiations between the parties on the premises of a business establish-
ment at a fixed location where such goods or services are offered or
exhibited for sale."6 In the latter category are exclusions of sales of
personal wearing apparel, motor vehicles, farm equipment, and "goods
and services utilized in connection with funeral services.""
'UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 2.501-.505.
12N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-38 (Supp. 1971).
93449 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 1248 (1972). see text accompanying
note 32 supra.
" However, the FTC has required magazine subscription sellers to grant a three-day cooling-
off period. Time, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (1971 Trade Cas.) ] 19,564 (FTC 1971).
14N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-38 (Supp. 1971).
"Id. § 25A-38(1)-(3) (Supp. 1971).
U/d. § 25A-38(5) (Supp. 1971). There is a question as to whether the "funeral services"
exemption applies to prepaid funeral plans. Is there a requirement that there be a close proximity
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The cancellation right may be waived by the buyer in emergency
circumstances. 8 This emergency exception first appeared in the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act. 9 The federal statute applies to transac-
tions that involve a security interest in the principal residence of the
debtor, whether or not the transaction was solicited by the seller or
signed at the buyer's residence. In that context the emergency exclusion
is essential; without it the debtor would not be able to obtain emergency
repairs to his residence unless he paid cash.
However, in the context of the "home solicitation sale," the need
for the emergency exclusion is much less convincing. The statute re-
quires "solicitation" at the buyer's residence as a condition to coverage.
It is difficult to see how an emergency provider of services who is called
by the buyer would be deemed to have "solicited" at the buyer's resi-
dence. On the other hand, it is difficult to envision a door-to-door
salesman who calls upon the buyer having anything to sell for which the
buyer would have an emergency need.70 Unless it is strictly limited, the
emergency exclusion is an invitation for mischief by sellers of fire
alarms, encyclopedias, pest control, and other similar goods and serv-
ices.
To invoke the emergency exclusion the buyer must request the
seller in a "separate writing to provide goods or services without delay
because of an urgency or an emergency. ' 71 After signing the statement,
the buyer may nevertheless cancel by giving notice prior to the time that
the "seller in good faith makes a substantial beginning of perform-
ance, '7 2 provided that if goods have been delivered, they can be returned
in "substantially as good condition as when received" if the buyer re-
turns them at his expense.73
Where the emergency exclusion is not invoked, the three-day period
between the time of the death and the time of the contract? The use of the past tense "utilized"
imparts a faint suggestion that there is, but more than a faint suggestion should be required to
limit the statute. However, from the standpoint of the seller, uncertainty should be met with
compliance. It is preferable to risk a few cancellations than to risk that all contracts might be
subject to cancellation without time limit,
"Id. § 25A-39(e) (Supp. 1971).
"CCPA § 125(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1602 (1970); cf Regulation Z § 226.9(e).
"Perhaps, in a time of natural disaster, sellers might make the first approach to the buyer
and be deemed to have "solicited." But if such circumstances provide the justification, the exclusion
should be limited to them.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-39(e) (Supp. 1971).
121d. § 25A-39(e)(l) (Supp. 1971) (emphasis added).
73d. § 25A-39(e)(2)-(3) (Supp. 1971). The requirement that the goods be returned at the
buyer's expense is a North Carolina addition.
1972]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
for cancellation begins to run when the buyer signs an agreement that
contains the statutory form of notice to the buyer.7" If the seller's con-
tract does not contain the required notice, the three-day period never
runs and the buyer can cancel at any time.
Where the seller has provided the correct notice, the buyer may
cancel by giving, notice of intent by midnight of the third business day
following the signing of the original agreement. The buyer's notice must
substantially comply with the statutory statement." If the buyer mails
a properly addressed, postage-prepaid notice, the cancellation is effec-
tive at the time of the deposit in the mail."
After cancellation, the seller must within ten days return any con-
sideration given by the buyer and is obligated either to return any goods
traded in in "substantially as good a condition as when received" or to
pay the amount of the trade-in allowance stated in the contract." Thus,
the seller has the risk of accidental loss of traded-in goods while they
are in his control. That should tend to discourage the seller from prema-
turely taking the buyer's goods as an inducement to cause the buyer to
feel more committed to the transaction.
A seller who complies with his obligation under the Act is permit-
ted to retain a cancellation fee of one percent of the cash price, not
exceeding the amount of the cash down payment."
The buyer's duties after cancellation are to tender upon demand by
the seller any goods delivered by the seller. Most states require only that
the buyer make the goods available at.his residence. The North Carolina
statute provides that the buyer's obligation of tender is limited to his
residence only "if the seller does not have a place of business within 25
miles of the residence of the buyer."79 If the seller does have a place of
business within twenty-five miles,80 he can presumably demand a return
by the buyer of the goods to that place of business. This is unjustifiable.
A buyer should not be hindered in the exercise of his cancellation rights
in regard to heavy or cumbersome property simply because he has no
7 Id. § 25A-39(a) (Supp. 1971).
11Id. § 25A-40 (Supp. 1971).
71Id. § 25A-39(b)-(c) (Supp. 1971).
"nd. § 25A-41 (Supp. 1971).
7"Id. § 25A-41(c) (Supp. 1971). The Uniform Consumer Credit Code provides for retention
of a 5% cancellation fee. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.504.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-42 (Supp. 1971).
"A literal reading of the provision would allow the seller to demand tender anywhere in the
universe if he has a place of business within 25 miles of the buyer. This probably was not intended.
[Vol. 50
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pick-up truck and strong friends. The seller was quite capable of deliver-
ing the property in the face of the known cancellation right. If that right
is to be fully meaningful, the seller must also have the obligation to pick
up the property at the place to which it was delivered.
The consequence of a buyer's being unable to make a proper tender
is unclear. Arguably, the failure in that regard does not retroactively
render the cancellation ineffective. At least the statute does not so pro-
vide. If the cancellation is still effective, the seller could not sue upon
the contract; rather, his claim would be in the nature of a recovery
against a bailee, and the buyer would be liable for the reasonable value
as distinguished from the contract price.
If the seller fails to make a demand for tender within a reasonable
time (presumed to be forty days), the goods become the "property of
the buyer without obligation to pay for them."8'
The buyer's general duty with respect to the seller's goods in his
possession is to use reasonable care in their preservation .8 The buyer
would not be liable for accidental loss of the goods, and the seller would
have the risk of loss with respect to causes that were not preventable
by reasonable care of the buyer.
The North Carolina statute also contains a provision that allows a
buyer who has not received delivery of the goods or services within thirty
days after the execution of the contract to cancel if the delay in delivery
is the fault of the seller."
Referral Sales. The Act renders "referral sales," whether or not
they are "consumer credit sales," unlawful and void.84 The unqualified
term "referral sale" could apply to any transaction in which the buyer
receives a commission or rebate on the price for furnishing leads of
prospective customers to the seller, including sales in which the commis-
sion or rebate was conditioned upon one of the following events: (1) the
buyer's furnishing names of friends who might be prospective customers
to the seller; (2) the buyer's furnishing names and personally contacting
each referee by telepone or letter; (3) the same as (1) or (2), except that
the referee must not have been named or contacted by a previous buyer;
(4) a previously unnamed referee's being contacted by the buyer or seller
and agreeing to sit for a demonstration by the seller;8 5 or (5) the referee's
81N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-42(a) (Supp. 1971).
11Id. § 25A-42(b) (Supp. 1971).
'mId. § 25A-39(f) (Supp. 1971).
"Id. § 25A-37 (Supp. 1971).
"'The first four categories can be varied by the seller through the imposition of additional,
often vague conditions such as that the referee must be "credit worthy."
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purchasing the product from the seller.
A plan that involves one of the first two events, if honestly adminis-
tered by the seller, has little potential for deceiving the buyer as to the
amount of "earning potential." Most buyers would have the simple
mathematical ability to evaluate the plan. However, such a plan does
have an element of deception as to the price and quality of the goods
or services. The acts that are required of the buyer are simple and will
be performed by most persons, but at the same time they are of minimal
benefit to the seller. Therefore, an item that has a price of three hundred
dollars accompanied by a referral plan that enables the buyer to reduce
the price to two hundred dollars with little effort and little benefit to
the seller is an item that is worth about two hundred dollars. Further-
more, it would be unlikely that the seller ever receives more than two
hundred dollars for it. The purported three hundred dollar price and the
referral plan are just gimmicks to make it appear to the unsophisticated
buyer that he is receiving a bargain because of his efforts.
Referral plans that involve the latter three types of conditions
clearly have great potential for deceiving the average person as to earn-
ing capacity. In each type the individual buyer is placed at some level
of a geometric progression. Unless he knows the level and appreciates
the consequences of the geometric progression, he has no capability to
evaluate the probabilities of earning any substantial amount under the
plan. For example, assume that a plan requires the buyer to produce
twenty referees to earn the maximum benefit under the plan. 6 A buyer
who is brought in at the third level 7 is potentially competing with four
hundred other buyers in his community who must find produce eight
thousand new names if each third-level buyer is to receive the maximum
return. The chance of the third-level buyer meeting the third type of
condition is small, his chance of meeting the fourth is smaller, and his
chance of meeting the fifth is virtually nil. The quantity of referees that
is required to yield the maximum returns rises geometrically while the
potential market remains essentially stable (and probably small). There-
fore, in reality the earnings from the plan will not be sufficient to pay
off the mortgage on the house," to send the daughter to college,89 or
even to pay any significant part of the price of the purchased product.
"Some plans require 40 referees for maximum earnings; others are open-ended, but the
principle remains the same.
'That is, the buyer was referred by another buyer who in turn was referred by the first buyer.
"See State v. ITM, Inc. 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
"See Norman v. World Wide Distribs., Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963).
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Even if the salesman resists the temptation to boast about his plan's
earning potential, the average buyer is incapable of evaluating the pro-
posal on the basis of the information that is given him'" Further, sales-
men unequestionably compound the deception and emphasize the earn-
ing potential by methods ranging from inferences to gross falsehoods.
These facts have caused increasing effort in recent years to regulate or
curtail referral selling. In the absence of specific legislation, such plans
have been attacked successfully on the ground that the chance elements
are sufficient to constitute them lotteries." The Federal Trade Commis-
sion has issued complaints against pyramid distributorship plans, con-
tending that they constitute deceptive trade practices and lotteries in
violation of the public policy of the United States.12 One plan, which
also involved numerous affirmative direct misrepresentations, was en-
joined under a statute covering "persistent fraud. '93
Finally, many states have enacted statutes that directly regulate
referral sales. 4 The statutes vary significantly in detail. Some apply only
"Obviously, the individual buyer's chances also depend upon the time at which he enters, in
relation to other buyers at his level, since there are not going to be 8,000 qualified persons left in
a community.
"Commonwealth v. Allen, 404 S.W.2d 464 (Ky. 1966); Sherwood & Roberts-Yakima, Inc.
v. Leach, 67 Wash. 2d 639, 409 P.2d 160 (1965). Contra, Yoder v. So-Soft, Inc., 202 N.E.2d 329
(Stark County, Ohio, C.P. 1963). The Yoder court held, however, that the referral selling plan
was a "security"-a view that has not been followed elsewhere. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH,
SECURITIES REGULATION 252 (2d ed. 1968).
92Holiday Magic, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) 91 19,291 (FTC 1970) (proposed
complaint), 3 TRADE REG. REP. (1971 Trade Cas.) 19,461 (FTC 1971) (complaint issued): Ger-
Ro-Mar, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (1971 Trade Cas.) 1 19,718 (FTC 1971) (proposed complaint),
3 TRADE REG. REP. (1971 Trade Cas.) 19,865 (FTC 1971) (complaint issued). A proposed
complaint has been filed in Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (1971 Trade Cas.)
1 19,576 (FTC 1971 ). The pyramid distributorship and the last three types of referral sales are near
relations. See also State ex reL. Turner v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., - Iowa -, 191 N.W.2d
624 (1971). There the court declared constitutional the Iowa statute regulating referral sales and
upheld its application to a pyramid distributorship.
The 1971 General Assembly also enacted a statute that is directed specifically at "pyramid"
or "chain" distribution plans. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-291.2 (Supp. 1971). That statute declares such
plans to be lotteries subject to criminal penalties, provides for injunctive relief, a civil penalty in
favor of the State, and provides that contracts for the sale of such plans are void.
"State v. ITM, 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
,;Act 2052, § 10, [1971 ] Ala. Laws (I CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE (Ala.) 6015 (Oct. 26,
1971)); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-5003 (Supp. 1971): CAL. CIV. CODE § 1803.10 (West Supp.
1971); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 73-2-411 (1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE (Colo.) 9 4480 (Sept.
16, 1970)) (Uniform Consumer Credit Code); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-140, -141 (Supp.
1971); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 476-1, -18(a) (1968); IDAHO CODE § 28-32-411 (Supp. 1971) (Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code); ILL. STAT. ANN. Ch. 121 , § 262A (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972): IND.
ANN. STAT. § 19-22-411 (Supp. 1971) (Uniform Consumer Credit Code); IOWA CODE ANN.
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to plans under which the referee must purchase;9" most apply to sales
in which the rebate is "contingent upon a future event."96 The range of
regulation is great-a requirement that the terms of the referral sale is
clearly set forth in the agreement,97 a requirement that the seller dis-
closes his recent experience in paying rebates, or an absolute prohibi-
tion. The penalty range is from actual damages or a minimum penalty 9
to a declaration that the sales are void or voidable. 09
The precise position of the North Carolina Act in this structure is
to some extent dependent upon subsequent construction. A not unrea-
sonable construction would extend the Act to all five of the types of
referral sales mentioned above. The Act condemns sales in which the
"price . . .is contingent upon the procurement of prospective custom-
ers . . . .". 0 There is not a requirement that the contingency relate to
a "future" event, and even if "contingent" is deemed to connote future,
there is no point of reference. The earning of the rebate in the first
category is contingent upon or conditioned upon the furnishing of the
list of names. This should be sufficient unless the "procurement of
prospective customers"'' 02 requirement is deemed to impart some addi-
tional future connotation or is restrictively construed to require more
than the furnishing of names. Certainly, the latter four types listed
involve "future events" and would be covered by the Act.
§ 713.24(2)(b) (Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325.79(2) (Supp. 1972); L.B. 267, § I. [1971]
Neb. Sess. L.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-37 (Supp. 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 2-411
(Supp. 1971) (Uniform Consumer Credit Code); ORE. REv. STAT. § 646.608(o) (1971); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 73, § 201-2(xii) (1971); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5609-6.02(5)(1) (1971); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 70B-2-411 (3 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE (Utah) 4480 (Sept. 18, 1969))
(Uniform Consumer Credit Code); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-411 (Supp. 1971) (Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code).
"ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 121 , § 262A (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
73, § 201-2(xii) (1971).
"E.g., the statutes of Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana,
Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, and Wyoming.
"TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-6.02(5)() (1971).
"R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-29-1 (1969).
"E.g., ORE. REV. STAT. § 646.'608(o) (1971).
"I'This is by far the most common penalty and is incorporated in most of the statutes listed in
note 94 supra. Some also include criminal penalties.
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-37 (Supp. 1971). The North Carolina statute is very similar in
wording to the Iowa statute that was upheld in State ex rel. Turner v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,
- Iowa - , 191 N.W.2d 624 (1971). The court there answered an imprecise contention by
the defendant with an observation that the "contingency" embodies a "futuristic element." but the
court also stated that "the contingency factor operated both in presenti and infuitiro." Id. at .
191 N.W.2d at 631.
'"
2N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-37 (Supp. 1971).
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Violation of the Act renders the sale void, with the necessary result
that the seller is not entitled to recover any part of the purchase price.
The Act also permits the buyer to recover any payments already made
upon a tender to the seller of "tangible consumer goods" that are part
of the transaction.M' This tender requirement has puzzling implica-
tions. The Act, of course, covers referral sales of non-consumer goods
and services. Therefore, the tender requirement, in mentioning only
consumer goods, can be read one of three ways: The buyer of non-
consumer goods can recover without tendering the goods; the recovery
is permitted only in consumer goods transactions, and there only 'upon
tender of the goods; or the recovery is permitted in all consumer transac-
tions but only upon a tender of any goods that are in possession of the
buyer.
The first reading is probably the most consistent with standard
construction principles since it gives full weight to the negative implica-
tion, but it is seemingly inconsistent with the basic purpose of the Act
to give greater protection to the consumer. The second reading is more
consistent with the probable purpose of the statute, but it gives the
improbable result of not permitting recovery for services that the seller
has rendered in violation of the statute and which the buyer cannot
return. The third reading involves essentially the moving of the word
"consumer" so that it modifies the second "buyer" in the last sent-
ence-an extreme technique at best. But that reading seems most consis-
tent with the general purposes. The intent of the General Assembly
probably could be honored only by disregarding the word "consumer,"
with the result that any buyer would be required to tender back any
goods in his possession as a condition to his own recovery.
The Performance Stage
In Absence of Default. If the contract is entered into in accord-
ance with the previously discussed rules and neither party thereafter
defaults on his obligation, the Act has minimal additional impact on the
transaction. Basically, the seller must make a required application of
payments in certain cases, provide periodic statements of account, and
give a rebate on prepayment.
If the seller has previously sold an item to the buyer and retains a
security interest in that first-purchased item to secure partially the pur-
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chase price of the subsequently purchased item, or if the seller has
consolidated two or more contracts into a single contract and payment
schedule, the seller is required to make a specified application of the
buyer's payments. 104 The purpose of the application-of-payments rule is
to insure that the buyer acquires the earlier-purchased items free of the
security interest at some reasonable time after he has paid more than
the cost of that item and before he has completely paid for both items.
In other words, the rule is designed to prevent the seller from retaining
a security interest 10 5 in each item until all are paid for.
Basically, the rules are that the seller must apply previous pay-
ments to the previous item, the down payment to the subsequent item,
and subsequent payments to both items on a pro rata basis that uses
the original cash prices as the elements of the proportion.' 0 However,
where the amount of the payments is increased as a result of the second
sale, the seller may apply the amount of the increase to the subsequent
item and the amount of the original payment on the cash price by the
pro rata method. This latter provision causes a substantial creditor bias
in the North Carolina statute when compared the rules in other states.0 7
Once every twelve months and when he "repays the debt early,"
the buyer is entitled to receive without cost from the seller a statement
of account that itemizes the various charges and remaining obligations.
There is no time limit during which the seller must respond, so presuma-
bly the buyer must be patient. The buyer is also entitled to a statement
of finance charges once a year, if it is requested "for income tax pur-
poses."'08
1011d. § 25A-27 (Supp. 1971).
"5Hence, repossessing in the event of default would not be permissible.
1"States having the Uniform Consumer Credit Code provide for a type of "first in, first out"
(FIFO) allocation. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 73-2-509 (1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE (Colo.)
] 4280 (Sept. 16, 1971)); IDAHO CODE § 28-32-409 (Supp. 1971); IND. ANN. STAT. § 19-22-409
(Supp. 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 2-409 (Supp. 1971); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70B-2-409
(3 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE (Utah) 4280 (Sept. 18, 1969)); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-409
(Supp. 1971). Four other states have similar provisions. ALASKA STAT. § 45.10.100 (1971). CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1808.2 (West Supp. 1971); HAWAII REV. STAT. 476-29 (Supp. 1971). MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 255D, § 18 (Supp. 1971). At least fifteen jurisdictions have rules that provide for pro
rata cash price allocation payments. See, e.g., TEx, REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-6.02(14)(c)
(1971); B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 106-07 (1965).
"'Those "cash price pro rata" states that have a provision for increased payments give the
seller an option to apply the amount of the increase in payments to the subsequent sale and the
amount of the original payments to the earlier sale. E.g., TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
5069-602(14)(c) (1971). The North Carolina provision, of course, goes one step further and allows
a division of the amount of the original payment. Thus, it defers for a longer period the release of
the earlier purchased items.
,"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-35 (Supp. 1971).
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The buyer has an absolute right to prepay the obligation in full at
any time and receive a rebate of the unearned portion of the finance
charge.'09 The rebate is based upon the "rule of 78's," which gives results
that are close to the product of an actuarial computation." 0 The seller
is entitled to retain an acquisition charge or prepayment penalty as
provided.
Default by the Buyer. In the not too distant past, sellers of con-
sumer goods who retained security interests under properly drafted
agreements had the comfort of knowing that upon feeling "insecure"
they could accelerate the due date of the obligation"' and, if the buyer
could not then pay it in full, declare a default, repossess the property
without judicial process," 2 sell the property at a public or private sale,"3
and recover a deficiency judgment for any difference between the sale
price and the unpaid obligation (including unearned finance charges).
Today, in some jurisdictions it is questionable whether the seller can do
any of the above.
The North Carolina Act restricts the seller to acceleration and
repossession only in the event of a "breach by the buyer of any promise
or condition clearly set forth in the agreement.""' 4 The seller is thus
limited to acceleration for those events that he had the foresight to
include in the contract as defaults. From the standpoint of the buyer,
this is far preferable to the vague "insecurity" standard, the exercise of
which the buyer could attack only by proving that the seller was not
subjectively honest in exercising it."5
Repossession is under attack as well. The Supreme Court has held
'Old. § 25A-32 (Supp. 1971). This is comparable to the right of prepayment under the usury
laws. Id. § 24-10(b) (Supp. 1971).
The prepayment right will have an as yet uncertain impact on the credit life insurance industry.
There are indications that credit life insurance has paid to the creditor the full outstanding balance
(including the unearned finance charge) upon the death of the debtor. If that continues, the debtor's
estate should receive the amount of the "rebate" due. However, if the credit life companies take
the position that their only obligation hereafter is the amount the debtor would have had to
pay-that is, less rebate-the payouts by the insurance companies should be less, and premium
reduction would seem to be in order.
"'See Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L.
REv. 445 (1968).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-208 (1965).
"1The seller had to be able to obtain possession without a breach of the peace. Id. § 25-9-
503 (1965).
91id. § 25-9-504 (1965).
11id. § 25A-19 (Supp. 1971).
115Id. § 25-1-208 (1965).
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that claim-and-delivery or replevin proceedings that take property with-
out prior notice and opportunity for hearing are violative of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment."' A federal district court
has held that private repossession pursuant to the Uniform Commercial
Code is likewise impermissible, at least with respect to consumer
goods." 7 If private repossession is ultimately foreclosed, the seller will
be required to obtain prior to repossession a judicial determination of
default, which except in exceptional circumstances may be tantamount
to a judgment against the buyer in the unpaid amount of the obliga-
tion."18
To date a significant number of jurisdictions have adopted statutes
that limit the seller's ability to obtain a deficiency judgment."' Typi-
"'Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972). There are three possible factors affecting the
constitutionality of such a procedure: (1) search and seizure by state officials without a prior
showing of probable cause in violation of fourth amendment principles, (2) taking of property
without notice and hearing in violation of fifth amendment principles, and (3) absence of effective
waiver of the above rights by the debtor. See Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96
Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971). In Fuentes the Court dealt only with the latter two factors, noting that a
fourth amendment objection probably would be obviated by prior opportunity for an adversary
proceeding. The Court acknowledged that an effective waiver of the constitutional rights might be
made in advance, but left substantially unspecified the circumstances in which the waiver would
be effective. The Overmyer dictum, see note 51 supra, was repeated and inequality of bargaining
power and lack of knowledge of the debtor of the alleged waiver clauses were emphasized. How-
ever, it is unclear whether the Overmyer factors are viewed in the disjunctive or conjunctive-that
is, whether, for example, inequality in bargaining power alone might be a sufficient basis for
invalidating a waiver provision. Development of that issue must await future litigation. In the
meantime, creditors probably will rely less upon judicial repossession and more upon private
repossession, at least until the utility of the former is settled. See note 117 infra. Debtors should
not be gleeful about repossession effected by persons who do not operate under the restraints that
are imposed by public office, minimal though such restraints may often be.
n17Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972). Contra, Oiler v. Bank of America, No.
C 70-2559SW (N.D. Cal., filed Feb. 29, 1972). There is an obvious distinction between claim and
delivery and private repossession in the level of state involvement. The court in Adams found
sufficient state action by virtue of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-503 and 9-504, analogizing
them to the California Proposition 14 attacked in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). But
this is a weak link in the Adams analysis.
"The Supreme Court in Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972), indicated that a state could
provide for a summary procedure to determine only the right-to-possession issue that would not
involve a final judgment on the debt. But since undoubtedly most buyers are in fact in default and
the debt is in fact owing, it would seem more expeditious, on the average, to combine all issues in
a single proceeding that would result in judgment, usually by default on the debt.
"'The statutes typically provide that if the seller "repossesses or voluntarily accepts surrender"
of the goods and the original cash price was below a specified amount, typically $1,000, the buyer
is not liable for any deficiency. See Act 2052, § 9, [1971] Ala. Laws (1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT
GUIDE (Ala.) 6014 (Oct. 26, 1971)); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-5501 (Supp. 1971) (not applica-
ble to motor vehicles); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 73-5-103 (1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE
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cally, the deficiency judgment is abolished in trans-actions below a speci-
fied dollar amount. The North Carolina bill originally contained a pro-
vision that would have abolished the deficiency judgment where the
original price was less than one thousand dollars.' 20 However, this provi-
sion did not survive, and the Act does not contain any direct restraints
on the deficiency judgment.
However, in the event that the seller obtains a judgment or repos-
sesses the goods, he is required to credit the buyer's account with a
rebate of the unearned finance charge as if prepayment had been made
in full on the date of the judgment or fifteen days after repossession,
whichever is applicable.' 2' Following the rebate the judgment would, of
course, draw the legal rate of interest. 2 1 If the repossession precedes a
judgment, the same result should follow.'?
Default by the Seller. The consumer-buyer who receives perform-
ance that does not fulfill the promises that preceded it is all too com-
mon. The disappointment to this consumer has traditionally been com-
pounded by the fact that he could be compelled to continue to pay for
the defective performance while he located the seller, if the seller could
be found, and obtained from the seller repair or restitution, if that could
be coerced. This result was produced by one of two legal concepts-the
negotiable instrument or the waiver-of-defense clause.
The banker, the businessman, and the consumer-buyer who signed
negotiable instruments risked that the instrument would be transferred
to a holder in due course, who would be entitled to enforce the instru-
(Colo.) T 4310 (Sept. 16, 1971)) (Uniform Consumer Credit Code, but monetary limit changed to
$500). D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3812 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE (D.C.) 1 6166 (Dec. 21, 1971))
(not applicable if cash price less than $2,000); IDAHO CODE § 28-35-103 (Supp. 1971) (Uniform
Consumer Credit Code); IND. ANN. STAT. § 19-25-103 (Supp. 1971) (Uniform Consumer Credit
Code); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 5-103 (Supp. 1971) (Uniform Consumer Credit Code); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 83.830 (1971) (applies if unpaid balance at repossession is $700 or less); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 70B-5-103 (3 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE (Utah) 4310 (Sept. 18, 1969)) (Uniform
Consumer Credit Code); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 40-5-103 (Supp. 1971) (Uniform Consumer Credit
Code). Most of the statutes contemplate that where the seller is not entitled to a deficiency claim,
he need not resell and return any surplus. However, the District of Columbia statute requires the
seller to resell if 60% of the cash price has been paid and return any surplus.
12H. 156, 1971 North Carolina General Assembly, § 25A-24.
'
2 1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-32 (Supp. 1971).
22id. § 24-5 (1965).
ImThis is an amount owing by contract for which no rate is specified by agreement. The legal
rate would seem to control here as well. Cf General Metals, Inc. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 259 N.C.
709, 131 S.E.2d 360 (1963); Security Nat'l Bank v. Travelers Ins. Co., 209 N.C. 17, 182 S.E. 702
(1935).
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ment free of personal defenses, such as failure of consideration or fraud
in the inducement.2 4 It mattered not that the banker or businessman
normally received cash for the signing of a negotiable instrument
whereas the consumer normally received promises that were at least in
part executory, such as express or implied warranties of quality, or that
this was known to the holder. It was thought that the well-being of the
nation's economy, or something equally significant, was dependent upon
the maintenance of parity between bankers and consumers in regard to
the consequences of execution of negotiable instruments.
If the seller chose not to extract a negotiable instrument in the
transaction, results almost125 as satisfying to the ultimate assignees of
the contract would be obtained by inserting into the contract a clause
whereby the consumer "agreed" to "waive" as to an assignee his defen-
ses against the seller. It was thought that if the consumer could not
effectively signify unknowing assent to such boilerplate clauses his free-
dom to contract would be flawed.
Whatever might have been at stake in the application of these
concepts to the consumer-and experience has shown that it was not the
well-being of any economy-it is clear that the application resulted in
a misallocation of risk and loss. The individual injured consumer was
required to bear the cost of the inevitable, if few, fraudulent and
contract-breaching sellers. On the other hand, the financial institutions
have an expertise and sources of information that enable them to assess
and guard against the risk from the undesirable seller with an effective-
ness that is not even remotely possible for the individual consumer to
achieve. Moreover, the negotiable instrument and waiver-of-defense
clause were counterproductive to utilization of these superior resources;
they tended to reward most those financial institutions which learned the
least. Further, where the seller can be located, the financial institutions
have an immensely greater leverage to compel a just settlement than
does any consumer. Finally, losses that are not prevented or recouped
through use of the expertise or leverage can be distributed throughout
the credit economy by the financial institutions through increases in the
costs of credit, or through insurance if that is needed. Such residual
costs are properly a cost to be borne as a cost of continuing business,
12 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-305(2) (1965), Comment 7. The loss-of-defense problem in the
consumer area has been extensively and well reviewed in previous pages of this Review. Navin,
Waiver of Defense Clauses in Consumer Contracts, 48 N.C.L. REv. 505 (1970).
15The assignee holding a contract with a waiver-of-defense clause was generally subject to the
defense of fraud in the inducement. Navin, supra note 124, at 526-27.
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rather than a cost to be thrust upon the individual who is fortuitously
touched by the undesirable seller.
It is thus no accident that a large number of jurisdictions have
changed the underlying doctrine applicable to consumer transactions so
as to permit the assertion by the consumer of his defenses against assign-
ees and holders of his contracts. The statutes fall into two basic types:
those that allow assertion of all defenses without time limit ,2 and those
that allow assertion of defenses only if notice is given by the buyer to
the assignee within a specified period of time. 12 To accomplish its pur-
120Act 2052, §§ 4(a), 5(a), [1971] Ala. Laws (I CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE (Ala.) 6007,
6009 (Oct. 26, 1971)); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1804.1(a), 1804.2, 1810.7 (West Supp. 1971) (these
sections are not applicable to motor vehicles; see note 127 infra); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 28-3807 to
-08 (2 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE (D.C.) 1 6157-58 (Dec. 21, 1971)); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 520.74, .80 (Supp. 1971) (apply only to home improvement contracts); HAWAII REV. STAT.
.§ 476-18(b)-(d), 476-36 (1968); IDAHO CODE § 28-32-404 (Supp. 1971) (Uniform Consumer
Credit Code, Alternative A); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 3724(5) (Supp. 1970) (applies only to
"home repair contracts"); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, §§ 147, 153D(f) (1969); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 255B, § 19A (Supp. 1971), ch. 2550, § 25A (Supp. 1971), § 10(6) (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 375.941 (Supp. 1972); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 320: 21-a, 21-b (Supp. 1971) (applies only to
"hawkers" and "peddlers," i.e., sellers who go from "town to town or place to place," id. § 320:
I (Supp. 1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:16C-1(2), (3) (3 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE (N.J.)
1 6001 (Apr. 25, 1972)); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 403 (McKinney Supp. 1971) (does not apply to
motor vehicles, see note 127 infra, or to boats having a price of more than $5,000); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 25A-25(a) (Supp. 1971) (sales of other than personal property and transactions in which
a security interest is taken in real property); ORE. REV. STAT. § 83.820 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 69, §§ 615(F), (G) (1965) (applies only to motor vehicles; see note 127 infra); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 6-28-6 (1970); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70-B-2-403 to -404 (3 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE
(Utah) I 4380, 4390 (Sept. 18, 1969)) (Uniform Consumer Credit Code, Alternative A of§ 2-404);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2455 (1970); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 63.14.020, .150 (1966).
Alaska and Nevada have provisions rendering the waiver-of-defense clause invalid but appar-
ently have no statute affecting the negotiable instrument. ALASKA STAT. § 45.10.140 (1963); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 97.275 (Supp. 1967).
The Federal Trade Commission has proposed a trade regulation rule that would prohibit the
taking of a negotiable instrument or waiver-of-defense clause in retail transactions. Proposed FTC
Reg. § 433.1, 36 Fed. Reg. 1211 (1971).
'"The time within which notice of defenses must be given begins to run from the time (1) the
assignee mails the notice to the buyer or (2) of sale or delivery of the property. Unless otherwise
indicated, the following statutes use the first beginning point. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-145
(Supp. 1971) (90 days from delivery of the property); CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 2893.5, .7 (West Supp.
1971) (motor vehicles-15 days); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 4311-12 (Supp. 1968) (15 days-not
applicable to motor vehicles); IND. ANN. STAT. § 19-22-404 (Supp. 1971) (Uniform Consumer
Credit Code, except 60 days rather than 3 months); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.416(115), .417(208)
(Supp. 1971) (non-motor vehicle installment sales and home improvements contracts-15 days);
N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 302 (McKinney Supp. 1971) (motor vehicles-10 days); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 25A-25(b) (Supp. 1971) (sales of personal property-30 days from delivery of the property
and the buyer "receiving" notice, whichever is later); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, §§ 2-403 to -
404 (Supp. 1971) (Uniform Consumer Credit Code, except 30 days rather than 3 months); PA.
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pose the statute must, of course, make provision for the negotiable
instrument and the waiver-of-defense clause. Probably the most com-
mon techniques are either to prohibit the taking of a negotiable instru-
ment in a consumer transaction or to render consumer notes non-
negotiable and to provide for the desired degree of protection and loss-
shifting through specification of the effectiveness of the waiver-of-
defense clause.
In regard to negotiable instruments, it should be noted that the
removal of them from the consumer world does more than subject the
assignee to defenses; it denies him the ability to cut off claims of owner-
ship,'- and it grants to the consumer additional assurance that the
installment payments that are made by him will discharge his obligation
in the transaction)2 9
However, the North Carolina Act does not prohibit the taking of
negotiable instruments in consumer transactions; rather, it provides that
the "buyer may assert against the seller . . . or other holder of the
instrument or instruments of indebtedness any defenses available
against the original seller."' Thus, the seller could take a negotiable
instrument, and a holder could be a holder in due course of such instru-
ment, but the holder would be subject to defenses in accordance with
the provisions of the Act. However, notes that are executed in consumer
transactions must be identified as to origin so that subsequent holders
will be apprised that they are buying paper that is subject to defenses.,',
STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 1401-02 (Supp. 1971) (45 days-installment sales other than motor vehicles),
tit. 73, § 500-208 (1971) (15 days-home improvement contracts); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts.
5069-6.07, -7.09 (1971) (30 days); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-2-403, to -404 (Supp. 1971) (Uniform
Consumer Credit Code, except 45 days rather than 3 months).
""This is a right that a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument would have. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 25-3-305(1) (1965). The ability to cut off claims of ownership is of no concern to the
consumer, however.
12A negotiable instrument can be discharged basically only by payment to a holder. See Id.
§ 25-3-603 (1965). Thus, a consumer who makes installment payments without requiring produc-
tion of the note is taking some risk that the payee is no longer a holder and hence that the payment
would not pro tanto discharge the obligation on the instrument. It is only a slight risk because of
the possibility of the court's invoking agency law to protect the payor, but it is a risk nevertheless.
See Equitable Life Assurance Soe'y v. Lazarus, 207 N.C. 63, 175 S.E. 705 (1934). On the other
hand, if the transferee is a mere assignee, payment made prior to notice of subsequent assignment
and demand by the subsequent assignee for payment will discharge the obligation. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 25-9-318(3) (1965). Therefore, since commercial financing institutions probably do not buy paper
without knowledge of its origin and hence the claim of ownership freedom is of nominal signifi-
cance, on balance it is preferable to remove completely the negotiable instrument.
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-25 (Supp. 1971) (emphasis added).
1id. § 25A-24 (Supp. 1971).
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The rules of the Act regarding the assertion of defenses are differ-
ent for each class of property involved. These rules may be summarized
as follows:
(I) If the debt is secured by a "security interest" in real property,
the buyer may assert against the assignee or holder all defenses available
as against the original seller. 32
(2) If the sale is of "personal property," the buyer is deemed to
have waived all defenses against a good faith assignee who takes for
value unless the buyer notifies the assignee of the defense within thirty
days after delivery of the property and receipt by the buyer of "separate
written notice of the waiver and the assignment . ... ,, However,
the defenses of fraud in the inducement and failure of consideration are
never lost to the buyer.
(3) In all other cases the buyer may assert against the assignee
or holder all defenses available against the original seller. 134
In the first and third rules, North Carolina is equal to the most
advanced jurisdiction in regard to consumer protection. In the second
rule, North Carolina is somewhat below the median level of protection
offered among those jurisdictions that have adopted statutes on the
subject.
The rules raise several unresolved questions. As to the first rule,
does the term "security interest" include mechanic's and materialman's
liens that arise by operation of law, or is the term to be limited to
consensual liens such as mortgages or deeds of trust? Related usage of
the term "security interest" clearly encompasses interests that arise by
operation of law. The Uniform Commercial Code defines "security
interest" broadly-"an interest . . . which secures payment or per-
formance of an obligation.' 13 5 The term "security interest" in the
Consumer Credit Protection Act is defined by the Federal Reserve
Board to include mechanic's liens. 3 A mechanic's lienor is a "secured
'Id. § 25A-25 (Supp. 1971).
13id.
134id.
'Id. § 25-1-201(37) (1965). Of course, Article 9 of the UCC basically applies only to "con-
sensual" or contract-created interests. Id. § 25-9-102(a) (1965).
'Regulation Z § 226.2(z), 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(z) (1971). However, the court in N.C. Freed
Co. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 99,356
(W.D.N.Y. 1971), held that Congress did not intend that mechanic's liens be within the concept
of "security interest" in the statute CCPA § 125, 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1970). The court relied upon
two parts of that section of the statute. The first part, in subsection (a), refers to a security interest
that is retained or acquired. The court found that this subsection imparts a present as distinguished
1972]
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creditor" under the Bankruptcy Act.-'" Furthermore, in the context of
the North Carolina Act, the evidence before the General Assembly
suggested substantial abuses in certain segments of the "home im-
provement" industry. Persons were threatened with the loss of their
homes because of contracts for improvements that were not performed
correctly or contracts that were fraudulently obtained. That evidence
undoubtedly contributed substantially to the formulation of this special
rule regarding real property. The potential for loss to the consumer is
essentially the same whether a holder is enforcing a mechanic's lien or
a mortgage. 38 Thus, a seller who would acquire a mechanic's lien
would have to waive that lien to insure that the transaction would not
come within the first rule.
A second question is whether the seller of an item that is to be
affixed to real property, such as a furnace for the buyer's home, who
retains a security interest in that item has a security interest in "real
property" with the result that the first rule applies. Or, is the seller
selling "personal property" so that the second rule applies? If it can be
assumed that the furnace becomes a fixture, the first Oart of the ques-
tion probably must be answered in the affirmative. Generally, a fixture
interest is considered "real property" in North Carolina.3 However,
in this context, some earlier North Carolina cases hold that the prop-
erty sold subject to a security interest does not become a fixture as be-
tween the parties.' If those cases are held applicable here, the furnace
seller would be deemed not to have a security interest in real property,
and the goods sold would continue to be treated as personal property
as between him and the buyer. Thus, such a seller would probably get
the benefit of the second rule.
from future connotation. The second part, in subsection (b), refers to security interests that are
"given by the debtor." The court concluded that since mechanics' liens arise if at all in the future
and by operation of law rather than being given by the debtor, they are not within the section.
The first point seems an exceptionally narrow reading of the statute. But the North Carolina
Act provides "is secured," and therefore the first point of the Freed court has some relevance to
the North Carolina Act. However, the North Carolina Act has nothing comparable to the second
problem raised in Freed.
"'In re Cayne Constr. Co., 58 F.2d 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1932).
"'This assumes, of course, that an assignee can enforce a mechanic's lien. There seems to be
no inherent reason why he could not.
"'Brown v. North Carolina Joint Stock Bank, 213 N.C. 594, 597, 199 S.E. 140, 142 (1938);
Basnight v. Small, 163 N.C. 15, 18, 175 S.E. 269, 270 (1913).
"'E.g., Standard Motors Fin. Co. v. Weaver, 199 N.C. 178, 153 S.E. 861 (1930). See also
Smith, Article Nine: Secured Transactions-Perfection and Priorities, 44 N.C.L. REV. 753, 806-
08 (1966).
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The Act does not specify the relationship between the second rule
and the third rule, with the result that there is a question as to which
rule applies to transactions that involve both personal property and
services. It does not appear any more feasible here to divide a transac-
tion than it is with respect to questions of coverage of the Act."' There-
fore, in this context the predominent or main part of a transaction
should control the entire transaction. It is not likely that the General
Assembly intended that a sale of a refrigerator should be excluded from
the second rule because the contract also involves a service contract or
that a seller of services should be subject to the second rule because he
transfers title to minor amounts of personal property in conjunction
with the rendering of the services.
The second rule creates a statutory waiver of those defenses of
which the assignee does not receive notice within thirty days after both
of the prerequisites are met. The rule is too restrictive. First, the thirty-
day period is too short; the average buyer will have difficulty in ascer-
taining his rights and acting upon them within such a peribd. Secondly,
the buyer is not entitled to assert defenses that do not come to his
attention, such as concealed defects, until after thirty days.4 2 Of course,
the second rule provides that the buyer never loses and never will be
deemed to have waived the defenses of fraud in the inducement and
failure of consideration.
Fraud in the inducement is a personal defense that cannot be as-
serted against a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument 4
However, some courts have allowed fraud in the inducement to be as-
serted against a waiver-of-defense clause.'44 Whether the North Caro-
lina court would have so held is unclear. Nevertheless, the Act does
change prior law in regard to negotiable instruments. The Act does not
mention fraud in the execution, from which fact it might be implied that
it is one of the defenses that is lost to the buyer under the general waiver
provision. However, that should not be the result. The basic purpose of
the section is to give added protection to the consumer and to restrict
further the rights of assignees and holders. The negative implication
should not be taken to give a reversal of that purpose and change prior
'
42See text accompanying notes 15 & 16 supra.
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-25(b) (Supp. 1971). This should be contrasted with UNIFORM
CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.404, Alternative B, which allows the buyer to assert defenses that
arise after the ninety-day period.
'"See note 124 supra.
'See note 125 supra.
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law 115 as well so that the consumer loses the right to assert his defenses
against the worst type of fraud.
The exemption of the defense of failure of consideration gives rise
to the most significant question under the section. The unqualified term
can apply to a wide range of circumstances that involve a defective
performance of a contract. The North Carolina Supreme Court recently
has referred to failure of consideration as "a defense to an action
brought upon a contract against the party who has not received the
performance for which he bargained."'' Similarly, Williston's treatise
states that "[f]ailure of consideration . . . will exist wherever one who
has promised to give some performance fails without his fault to receive
in some material respect the agreed exchange for that performance."' 47
A breach of an express or implied warranty may constitute failure of
consideration.14 Therefore, if failure of consideration is given its nor-
mal, broad meaning, the buyer would not lose the ability to assert by
way of a claim of failure of consideration defenses that arise because of
breach of warranty or other defect in performance by the seller. The
problem with such a broad construction is that it goes too far. With
defective performance encompassed in the proviso, there is virtually no
function left for the thirty-day rule. Such a result would not accord with
the usual principles of construction.
It might, on the other hand, be argued that the General Assembly
intended "total" failure of consideration. But, if "total" was intended,
it might easily have been added. Furthermore, in the context of a sale
of personal property, a "total" failure of consideration is failure to
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-305(2)(c) (1965).
'Gore v. George J. Ball, Inc., 279 N.C. 192, 199, 182 S.E.2d 389, 393 (1971).
1'16 S. WILLISTO N, CONTRACTS § 814, at 17-18 (3d ed. 1962).
'In Swift & Co. v. Aydlett, 192 N.C. 330, 337, 135 S.E. 141, 145 (1926), the court stated:
"Evidence of a breach of warranty . . . is competent, not only in an action to recover damages
for such breach, or upon counterclaim for such damages as a defense to recovery of judgment for
the purchase price, but also to prove failure of consideration when such failure is pleaded in defense
of a recovery of the purchase price of the goods sold. ... (Emphasis added.) In C.I.T. Corp.
v. Hetland, 143 N.W.2d 94 (N.D. 1966), the contract was for sale of an airplane. The airplane
was defective and the FAA refused to issue an airworthiness certificate. The court states: "If such
certificate could not be obtained because of the condition of the plane, there was clearly a breach
of. . . warranty. . . . Failure of consideration in any material respect is ground for the rescission
of a contract as against the seller." Id. at 98. "[T]he term 'failure of consideration' frequently is
used interchangeably with damages for breach of warranty .... Hargrove v. Lewis, 313 S.W.2d
594, 596 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958). There are other examples. One court has drawn but not defined a
distinction between failure of consideration and breach of warranty. Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101,
123, 232 A.2d 405, 417 (1967). The defect there was that the goods were never delivered.
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deliver the property or goods.'49 But, as was heretofore noted, the thirty-
day period does not begin to run until "delivery of the property." Thus,
if failure of consideration is limited to "total" failure, the construction
suffers from much the same problem as the broader reading; it leaves a
significant part of the statute without substantial function.
Perhaps the General Assembly intended some degree of failure of
consideration between the two extremes, but if so that degree is difficult
to identify. A line of cases in North Carolina gives the buyer a defense
to a contract for sale if the goods are "worthless."' 0 This doctrine
appears to be similar to the English doctrine of "fundamental
breach."'' However, in the opinion of the author, the North Carolina
cases and the English doctrine can be subsumed in the express warranty
of description under the Uniform Commercial Code. 5 ' Together, they
simply reflect the minimal level of performance that is required of a
seller who has disclaimed all implied warranties but who nevertheless
purports to convey a described item. Such cases may tell us when there
is a failure of consideration by a seller who has assumed only a small
obligation, but they cannot tell us how to measure failure of considera-
tion in relation to a seller who has assumed a larger initial obligation.
If failure of consideration is a question of degree, that degree must be
a function of the particular obligation of the seller and expectation of
the buyer.
It is suggested that the concepts in the sale of goods article of the
Uniform Commercial Code can be used to give content to failure of
consideration as the term appears in the Act. Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, the buyer has a right to reject goods when they "fail in
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-25(b). It would seem that any degree of non-performance that
would be characterized as a total failure of consideration would not constitute "delivery of the
property." The delivery requirement must be measured in relation to the requirements of the
contract. There would be a total failure of consideration in a contract for the sale of an automobile
if the seller delivered a horse. Likewise, delivery of a horse would hardly appear to be a "delivery
of the property" that would start the thirty-day period running.
'See Christenson v. Friendly Ford Sales, Inc., 6 N.C. App. 137, 140, 169 S.E.2d 542, 544
(1969): "There was a failure of consideration if, at the time of the sale, the automobile could not
be used for the purposes for which it was intended." The defendant had introduced evidence that
the sale was "as is-where is." See also Hall Furniture Co. v. Crane Mfg. Co., 169 N.C. 41, 85
S.E. 35 (1915).
"'See Meyer, Contracts ofAdhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach, 50 VA. L. REv.
1178, 1187 (1964).
'"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-313(I)(b) (1966). The goods must conform to any description that
was made a part of the basis of the bargain. This surely implies that the goods will not be
"worthless" in relation to the function for which such described goods are normally used or that
the unqualified description describes some minimal level of quality.
19721
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
any respect to conform to the contract."'5 3 If the presence of a right of
rejection signify failure of consideration, this would be giving failure of
consideration its broadest meaning-a meaning that previously has been
found wanting. However, the right of rejection must be exercised by the
buyer within a reasonable period of time after the tender."' Thus, the
right of rejection will have been determined or lost within a very short
time after delivery and, certainly, well prior to the expiration of the
thirty-day period. A buyer who fails to notify the assignee of a defect
that would justify rejection has little claim to the right to assert that type
defense. Thus, the mere fact that a defense would give rise to a right of
rejection should not constitute that defense a "failure of consideration."
On the other hand, a buyer who does not make a timely rejection
has not necessarily lost all rights to return the goods to the seller. Where
the defect is of sufficient consequence and other conditions are met, the
buyer may yet "revoke his acceptance."'' However, revocation of ac-
ceptance is limited to cases in which the "non-conformity substantially
impairs" the value of the goods to the buyer and the seller has assured
the buyer that the defect would be cured or the defect could not reasona-
bly have been discovered earlier. 5 ' Thus, for example, if a buyer is
confronted with a major and theretofore latent defect several weeks
after the sale, he may be entitled to revoke his acceptance; or if the
buyer has accepted the goods with a known defect that the seller has
repeatedly assured the buyer would be repaired and it has not been, the
buyer might revoke his acceptance. On the other hand, a buyer who has
accepted and used goods cannot revoke for latent defects that do not
"substantially impair" the value of the goods to the buyer. In the first
two examples, the buyer might be said to have suffered a "failure of
consideration" within the meaning of the Act. In the latter example
there would be no "failure of consideration," and the buyer would be
remitted to his rights against the seller for breach of warranty. These
do not seem to be inappropriate results under the Act. The buyer who
is entitled to return the goods to the seller has a stronger case for not
being required to continue to pay for them than does the buyer who is
compelled by the Uniform Commercial Code to retain the goods and
seek compensation by way of the breach-of-warranty action. This ap-
"i-d. § 25-2-601 (1965).
541d. § 25-2-602 (1965).
I-ld. § 25-2-608 (1965).
'15 1d. § 25-2-608(I) (1965).
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proach does have the virtue of preserving meaning for both parts of the
second rule, and the approach is not far removed from the context in
which the failure-of-consideration claim often arises-rescission of the
contract. '17
A final question that inevitably will arise under the section is
whether the buyer who is asserting defenses may recover payments that
were made to the assignee prior to the time of the assertion of the
defense. The answer will almost unquestionably be negative, at least
where the assignee had no notice of the defense at the time that he
purchased the paper.58 However, any payments that are made by the
buyer after he notifies the assignee of the defense and prior to resolution
of the claim should be returned to the buyer if his claim proves valid.
REGULATION OF CHARGES AND FEES
Finance Charge Rates
The Act refers rate determination for revolving credit in which no
security interest in real property is taken to the earlier enacted statute
covering revolving credit.'59 The rate permitted under that statute is the
familiar one and one-half percent per month, or a nominal eighteen
percent per annum. The rates for non-revolving credit ("consumer credit
installment sales") are directly regulated by the Act. Under it the famil-
iar "time-price doctrine" can no longer be used to justify unlimited
finance charges in contracts of sale. The permissible rates for non-
revolving credit range from fourteen to twenty-two percent, depending
upon the amount financed, except that twenty-nine percent is permitted
in certain transactions that involve automobiles that are more than three
years old at the time of the sale.6 '
However, both of the rate structures are subject to the exception
that where a security interest in real property is taken the rate is limited
to twelve percent per annum. 161 The real property exception is seemingly
"'Revocation of acceptance is a rough equivalent to rescission; however, it does not carry the
election-of-remedies result that flowed from rescission. In other words, the buyer can revoke and
recover damages for breach of warranty.
' 'Such a result is commonly provided for in most statutes that deal with defenses of the buyer,
.e.g., UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.404, and it seems to have been the common law rule
in regard to assignments.
'"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-14 (Supp. 1971). The earlier statute is id. § 24-1I(a) (Supp. 1971).
1111d. § 25A-15 (Supp. 1971).
"4id. §§ 25A-14(b), -15(c) (Supp. 1971).
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intended to equalize the installment sale transaction rates with the loan
rates.6
2
The computation of rates for "consumer credit- installment sale"
transactions is referred to the rate that is disclosed for federal Truth-
in-Lending purposes."3 Thus, the Act incorporates by reference this
body of federal law and regulation in the interest of providing all per-
sons who are affected by this Act a convenient and accurate point of
reference.'64 The federal statute and regulations have been in effect for
over two years; the business community has long ago adapted to it;
extensive tables and other information are available; and all consumers
are required to receive a disclosure statement before consumation of any
transaction. If an accurate computation is made pursuant to Truth in
Lending, both parties can know at a glance whether the rates conform
the limitations of the Act.
Insurance Charges
The Act does not prohibit a seller from selling insurance in connec-
tion with a credit extension and receiving a share of the premium as a
"commission." The Act follows the lead of Truth in Lending and re-
quires that the seller include the cost of any purchased insurance in the
"'The loan rates are set forth in id. § 24-1.2 (Supp. 1971).
113d. § 25A-15(a) (Supp. 1971).
"'Incorporation of federal laws has been consistently approved in challenges to state income
tax laws that are based upon the federal law or return. E.g., Featherstone v. Norman, 170 Ga.
370, 153 S.E. 58 (1930); Thorpe v. Makin, 43 ill. 2d 36, 250 N.E.2d 633 (1969); Santee Mills v.
Query, 122 S.C. 158, 115 S.E. 202 (1922).
In the unlikely event that the rate computation methods in the CCPA and Regulation Z are
changed in the future, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-15 (1965) probably would have to be re-enactcd to
bring it back into conformity with federal law. The Act does not expressly attempt to incorporate
future changes in the federal law or regulation, and if it did a delegation-of-power question would
be presented. However, there is authority upholding state statutes that incorporate existing and
future federal tax law. Alaska Steamship Co. v. Mullaney, 180 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1950); Hickel v.
Stevenson, 416 P.2d 236 (Alas. 1966) (by implication); First Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Connely, 142 Conn. 483, 115 A.2d 455 (1955); Anderson v. Tiemann, 182 Neb. 393, 155 NW.2d
322 (1967). The Anderson court stated: "The adoption of a state income tax based upon present
and future federal income tax laws does not constitute a waiver of the sovereignty of the state, nor
an abdication of its functions, nor constitute a violation of the requirements of a representative
form of government." Id. at 409, 155 N.W.2d at 327. The court was also aided by a constitutional
provision granting the legislature the authority to "adopt an income tax based upon the laws of
the United States." NEB. CONST. art. VIII, § IB (emphasis added),
In North Carolina the propriety of the interest rate in thousands of real estate mortgages is
dependent upon N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-45 (1965), which in effect permits the Federal Housing
Administration from time to time to establish the permissible interest rate for FHA and VA
guaranteed mortgage loans that are closed with respect to land located in North Carolina.
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finance charge, unless the seller makes the required disclosures to the
buyer at the time of the sale.' Two types of insurance are recognized:
(1) credit life, accident, or health insurance (credit life insurance), and(2) property damage and liability insurance (property insurance).
If the seller requires that credit life insurance be purchased by the
buyer, the cost of such insurance must be included in the finance charge.
However, if the seller does not require its purchase and he discloses that
fact to the buyer, the cost is excluded from the finance charge and
becomes a part of the amount financed.
The creditor may require that property insurance be purchased as
a condition to the credit extension, but if he requires that it be purchased
through him, the cost must be included in the finance charge. If the
seller does not require that it be purchased from a particular source and
discloses that fact to the buyer, but the buyer elects to purchase from
the seller, the cost of such insurance need not be included in the finance
charge.
Insofar as consumer credit installment sale contracts are con-
cerned, these provisions of the Act are duplicative of the results that
would be obtained under Truth in Lending, because the rate computa-
tion under the Act is referred to Truth in Lending. However, as to
revolving credit, these rules do provide a local rule that the non-
qualifying insurance charges are included in the eighteen percent maxi-
mum provided in the revolving credit statute. 6 This was not clear
heretofore.
Transfer of Equity Fee
The Act permits the seller to impose a fee where he agrees to a
transfer of the collateral by the buyer to a third party.'67 The Uniform
Commercial Code provides that a debtor may voluntarily transfer his
rights in the collateral. 6 ' However, that provision is not clear on
whether a clause in the security agreement that makes such a transfer a
default is nevertheless enforceable by the seller. Professor Gilmore con-
cludes that the seller may declare a default under such circumstances."9
If that view is correct, the seller has the option, and upon sale or at-
"
5N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-17(a), (c) (Supp. 1971).
'"Id. § 25A-17(b) (Supp. 1971).
1t1d. § 25A-16 (Supp. 1971).
I'Id. § 25-9-311 (1965).
"'2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 43.3. at 1195 (1965).
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tempted sale by the debtor the seller is in a position to extract additional
fees or charges. The Act limits those charges and in the process rein-
forces Professor Gilmore's view of the Uniform Commercial Code pro-
vision.
Default Charges
Whenever any payment is past due for ten days or more, the seller
may impose a default charge of up to five percent of the installment past
due but not in excess of six dollars.'70 In three subsequent unclear sent-
ences the Act apparently provides that if the defaulted payment is not
made up by the buyer prior to the due date of the next installment, the
seller may not apply the next payment to the previously due installment
and treat the currently due installment as also being in default. For
example, assume that the contract called for monthly payments that are
due on the first day of each month. The buyer does not make the
payment due on January 1. Ten days later the seller imposes a default
charge. On February 1 the buyer makes a correct payment. Apparently,
the seller may not apply the payment made on February 1 to the Janu-
ary 1 installment in order to create a default on the February 1 install-
ment. If this were not the rule, the seller could in certain situations turn
a single default into a default on every other payment. Also, the Act
prohibits the seller from imposing more than one default charge for each
default. Thus, when the buyer defaults on a single payment but makes
regular payments thereafter, the seller is limited to the initial five-
percent fee. The seller would, of course, have the option of accelerating
where the default is not made up by the buyer.
Deferral Charges
Subsequent to the initial execution of the contract, the parties may
agree to defer the due date of one or more installments, and the seller
is permitted to impose a deferral fee of one and one-half percent per
month for each installment deferred.17 1 For example, assume that nine
monthly installments remain to be paid at the time of the deferral
agreement. The parties agree to allowing the buyer to skip one month's
payment and make it up at the end. This deferral may be viewed as a
nine-month deferral of one installment or a one-month deferral of each
17oN.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-29 (Supp. 1971).
1111d. § 25A-30 (Supp. 1971).
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installment, and the seller may impose a fee of thirteen and one-half
percent of a single installment or one and one-half percent of each of
nine installments.
Consolidation and Refinancing Charges
There will be situations in which a more radical restructuring of the
transa ction is required than can be accomplished through a deferral
agreement. The Act recognizes consolidation and refinancing agree-
ments and provides that finance-charge rates under such agreements
may not exceed what would be permitted if an original sale transaction
were involved.' At the time of consolidation or refinancing, the old
debts are treated as paid in full and the seller must "rebate" all unearned
finance charges under the old contract to arrive at the amount financed
under the new agreement.
Attorney's Fees
The Act authorizes a court to award reasonable attorney's fees to
a prevailing seller as plaintiff and to the prevailing buyer as defen-
dant."' But there is no provision for attorney's fees for the buyer as a
plaintiff, except where the buyer is recovering excessive finance charges.
The reason for not including the prevailing buyer as plaintiff in other
types of cases and the prevailing seller as defendant is unclear.
The attorney's fees provisions also give rise to a question concern-
ing their relationship to an earlier statute that allows creditors (includ-
ing sellers) to recover attorney's fees as provided in the agreement, 7 but
not in excess of fifteen percent of the outstanding balance and basically,
only if the debtor has been given five days' notice and an opportunity
to pay the obligation. However, litigation is not a condition to recovery
of the fees. The question is whether that statute is superseded by the
attorney's fees provisions of the Act insofar as consumer credit sale
transactions are concerned. It is possible for the two statutes to operate
concurrently, with only a slight change in the effect of the earlier statute.
That earlier statute could be deemed to continue to apply to pre-
litigation attorney's fees for the seller, and the provisions of the Act
could be deemed to apply only in the event of litigation with the result
1121d. § 25A-31 (Supp. 1971)
1131d. § 25A-21 (Supp. 1971).741d. § 6-21.2 (1969).
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that there is no fifteen-percent limit and the amount is in the judge's
discretion. However, another section of this Act must also be consid-
ered. That section restricts the "fees," "charges," and "sums" that may
be received by a seller to thosd that are "authorized by this Chapter.""'
It is- certainly possible to read that provision in such a way that the
seller's attorney's "fees" would be limited to those provided by this Act.
On the other hand, that provision might be construed as referring to
charges that are received and retained by the seller and not to those that
would be paid over to an attorney. The answer is simply not definite.
THE BUYER'S REMEDIES FOR VIOLATION OF THE ACT
Several sections of the Act contain specific internal remedies for
violation. A confession-of-judgment clause taken in violation of the Act
is void. 76 Similarly, security interests taken in property othier than that
permitted by the Act are void. 77 The home solicitation sale sections
provide their own remedies, 7 and a referral sale is void.'79 An uncons-
cionable contract or clause may be refused enforcement or limited in
application. 8 ° Other sections should have specified consequences of vio-
lation but do not. For example, several types of agreements are required
to be in writing, 8' but the effect of failure to do so is not specified.
Certain disclaimers of warranty are prohibited, 82 but the effect of viola-
tion is not stated. Generally, however, where the seller has contracted
for or required something that is prohibited the court appropriately
could refuse enforcement of the clause or requirement. If the seller is
refusing to do an act that is required, such as furnishing a statement of
account, the debtor might have damages or conceivably would be enti-
tled to a mandatory order from a court.
If the seller has imposed excessive finance charges in an amount
less than two times the permissible amount, the seller is precluded from
recovering any finance charge in the transaction, and the buyer may
recover twice the amount of any finance charge already paid plus rea-
sonable attorney's fees.'- However, if the excessive charge resulted
1751d. § 25A-44(3) (Supp. 1971).
17 1d. § 25A-18 (Supp. 1971).
'7d. § 25A-23(b) (Supp. 1971).
17Jd. § 25A-39 to -42 (Supp. 1971).
1111d. § 25A-37 (Supp. 1971).
"Old. § 25A-43 (Supp. 1971).
"'Id. § 25A-28, -30(b), -31(b) (Supp. 1971).
"'Id. § 25A-20 (Supp. 1971).
'"Id. § 25A-44(i) (Supp. 1971).
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from accidental or good faith error, the seller is liable only for the
amount of the excess. 84
If the seller has imposed a finance charge greater than two times
in excess of that permitted, the transaction is deemed void." 5 The Act
specifies that the buyer may retain any property received by him without
obligation to pay for it, but it does not provide for the situation in which
the buyer has already paid. At the very least the buyer should be entitled
to tender back any goods and recover payments made by him. Further,
there is no conceiveable excuse for such an excessive overcharge, and
since results should not depend upon the time that the buyer discovers
the overcharge, the buyer should be entitled to recover payments made
under such a contract without tendering back any goods received by
him.
Any other excessive or not specifically permitted fee or charge of
due rebate that is retained by the seller may be recovered by the buyer. 8'
The seller is given incentive to make prompt response to proper requests
for return of such charges; if the seller does not return them within ten
days after he has received a written request therefor from the buyer, the
buyer may recover treble the amount owing. 8 7
"Knowing and willful violation of any provision" of the Act "shall
constitute an unfair trade practice under [General Statutes Section] 75-
I.I''88 This provision thus incorporates much of Chapter 75 and
thereby grants to the Attorney General the authority to make investiga-
tions of and seek injunctions against violations of the Act.88 However,
the effect of this reference upon the buyer's private remedies is unclear.
In general, a person injured by an unfair trade practice may recover
treble damages.' The question is whether this Act's incorporation of
Chapter 75 incorporates as well the treble damage provisions. It can be
argued that section 44(4) of this Act states a different offense from the
general violation of the Act-that is, a "knowing and wilful violation."
Therefore, the remedy provisions in Chapter 25A should apply to inno-
cent violations and should be supplemented by Chapter 75 as to inten-
tional violations. For example, if a seller takes excessive security or fails
'gild.
IgId. § 25A-44(2) (Supp. 1971).
"IId. § 25A-44(3) (Supp. 1971).
'"Id.
"'Id. § 25A-44(4) (Supp. 1971).
1111d. § 75-9, -14 (Supp. 1971).
"'Id. § 75-16 (Supp. 1971).
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to make a proper application of payments so that items are not properly
released from the security interest and subsequently repossesses and
sells the collateral in violation of the Act, he should be liable in conver-
sion to the debtor. If the violation of the Act was committed knowingly
by the secured party, treble damages in an action for conversion would
not be inappropriate. Thus, with respect to most provisions of the Act,
it is possible to accomodate such a dual system of remedies. However,
in respect to situations in which the Act specifies a monetary recovery,
it is not likely that treble damages could ever be sustained. If the seller
imposes an excessive finance charge, the specific recovery of twice the
amount of the finance charge is provided. It is not likely that a treble
(hence sixfold) recovery was intended where the violation was "know-
ing," particularly in view of the fact that the same specific section
provides a lesser penalty for "accidental or good faith" error.
In the situation involving more than twice the permissible finance
charge, the debtor is already compensated through retention of the
property and avoidance of the obligation, and it is not likely that addi-
tional damages would be called for.
Finally, the excessive fee or rebate provision has its own treble
recovery provision; it is not likely that a nine-fold recovery was intended
under any circumstances.
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